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Science Courts, Evidentiary Procedures
and Mixed Science-Policy Decisions
Carl F. Cranor*
Introduction
Mixed science and policy decisions are common. The scientific and
policy questions that must be answered in order to make defensible
decisions are difficult, do not admit of obvious answers, are frequently
plagued by controversy, and are often second-guessed.
Specifically, such decisions and the institutions that make them are
frequently criticized by the scientific community as irrational and not
properly founded on good scientific evidence and theory. For example,
tort litigation which serves to compensate victims injured by others'
activities and products, as well as to deter similar conduct in the future,
has been criticized as making decisions, at least sometimes, on the basis
of "junk science," i. e., scientific theories that have no basis in scientific
fact or theory. 1 Also, regulatory institutions that attempt to prevent
harm from technological products or processes before they injure the
public or employees in the workplace have been criticized - on the one
hand for basing regulations, not on proper scientific risk assessments,
but rather upon public sentiment and pressure, and on the other hand for
being captured by industry's conception of the science.
As recounted elsewhere in this issue, Arthur Kantrowitz proposed a
science court as an alternative or supplement to existing institutions.
With advocates on both sides of a scientific debate and judges to
evaluate their claims, a science court would evaluate only the scientific
portion of mixed scientific-policy debates. His aim was to assure more
* Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean, College of Humanities and Social
Sciences, University of California, Riverside. B.A. (Mathematics), University of
Colorado; Ph. D. (Philosophy), University of California, Los Angeles and M.S.L.
(Law), Yale Law School.
1 PET HUBER, GAUEs REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
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accurate scientific information about technical issues, to limit the policy
making powers of scientists (who are claimed to have too much policy
influence), to prevent policy makers from hiding behind scientific
conclusions for their policy decisions, and to identify and expose
discredited scientific claims. 2
Kantrowitz originally suggested that a science court might work best
when addressing relatively specific, but "big" or "large scale" questions,
such as whether the SST would harm the ozone layer or how rapidly to
reduce automobile emissions. Since then, however, writers have
suggested that any such procedure should be directed at quite specific
scientific and technological issues that are addressed by regulatory
agencies or even those that may arise in tort cases.
Exactly what role science courts should have or the aims they should
serve is unclear. Should they address only very general scientific
questions, and thus serve to modify the procedures of institutions such
as the National Academy of Sciences? Should they replace technical
sections in agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), or
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)? As the symposium
introduction asks: Would they constrain or enhance the influence of
scientists in public policy debates? Moreover, would they facilitate
separation of scientific and policy issues, and is this desirable? These
are only a few of the questions that might be raised about science courts,
but they are more than enough for this paper.
Many of Kantrowitz's concerns have merit. We should certainly
resist scientists who propose their own projects and succeed because of
special influence as may have happened with Star Wars. Also, even
though scientists have technical expertise, that does not authorize them
to make moral and political recommendations; their votes should count
no more or less than others in a democracy. Neither is it desirable to
have politicians avoid political responsibility for normative aspects of
decisions nor for Washington science advisors to exercise inordinate
2 See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 163
AM. ScIENTISt 505 (1975); see also, James A. Martin, The Proposed "Science
Court", 75 MIcH. L.REV. 1058 (1977).
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influence. Finally, most would agree that it is difficult to comprehend
and control technological developments. Any institutional procedure
which adequately addressed these concerns is to be commended.
In what follows, I do not focus directly on these issues. Instead, I
consider the strengths and weaknesses of science courts to address but
one aspect of our technological revolution - the identification and
control of toxic substances. This group of mixed science-policy
decisions may or may not be representative, but it serves to make issues
specific, to illustrate some shortcomings of using science courts, and to
illuminate some generic difficulties of relying upon scientific expertise to
address sharply contested issues on the frontiers of knowledge.
With regard to control of toxic substances, it seems difficult, if not
impossible, to separate socially useful scientific facts from normative
judgments. It also appears that, because of different evidentiary
requirements for scientific inquiry and public policy decisions, an
attempt to separate the science from normative considerations and adhere
to evidentiary standards typical of research science will poorly serve
public debate on relevant issues. Thus, insofar as mixed science-policy
problems raised by the identification, assessment and regulation of toxic
substances are typical, science courts may not be the best way to
address the scientific aspects of mixed science-policy issues. And if the
problems raised here are atypical, this suggests limits to the applicability
of science courts to technological problems.
Desiderata
The general issue raised by science courts is the desirability of
having one institution or procedure rather than another to address mixed
science-policy questions; there are several desiderata by which such
procedures might be judged. The most obvious, and frequently claimed
to be lacking, is scientific accuracy. A decision reached by an institution
should be scientifically accurate or rest on accurate scientific judgments.
On the one hand, if harm is alleged to be caused by a substance, and in
fact it is not, but the government has acted because of public concerns,
society will have wasted time, money and human resources in
addressing a non-existent problem. On the other hand, if a substance is
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misjudged not to cause harm, then people will be injured, and society
will have wasted money by producing too much of a harmful product.
Thus, the criterion of accuracy is critical and one to which Kantrowitz
gives high priority. However, since no procedure is unerringly accurate,
the evidentiary procedures that aim to secure accuracy are important.
Also, the kinds and the costs of mistakes resulting from institutional
procedures merit comment.
The kinds of mistakes likely to result from imperfect institutional
procedures involves the distribution of institutional mistakes. Decisions
about potential toxic substances which rest on imperfect scientific
procedures may result in false positives, also called type I errors (a
substance is wrongly thought to cause harm or risks of harm), or false
negatives, also called type II errors (a substance or product is wrongly
believed to be "safe"). Which kind of mistake should be of most
concern raises questions of the social consequences of different kinds of
mistakes in the context of different kinds of institutions. For example,
criminal procedures strongly protect against wrongly punishing an
innocent person, the juridical equivalent of a false positive, but public
health agencies tend to be more concerned with missing possibly
dangerous product or diseases, than the criminal law or pure scientific
research.
The costs of making one kind of mistake rather than another are
especially important in designing and deciding upon evidentiary
procedures. In assessing possible toxic substances, false positives may
misdirect investment and impose costs on manufacturers, shareholders,
and consumers of their products. The very existence of firms or product
lines or the welfare of the public may be threatened. False negatives
impose costs on those put at risk of death, disease, or compromised
quality of life - along with associated economic costs.
In science, peer review, demanding standards of evidence and
research practices all protect against false positives to avoid mistakenly
adding to the stock of scientific knowledge and misguiding future
research. 3 In contrast, when scientific research is used for public
3 False negatives are typically of lesser concern in science, perhaps on the theory
that even if a scientific fact has not been detected, if it exists, it will eventually come
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heath purposes, such as designing procedures to screen for rubella
antibodies, to detect the AIDS virus, or to identify toxic substances, the
costs of false negatives become much more important. Thus, in addition
to accuracy, simpliciter, in evaluating institutional decisions which have
substantial social consequences, the distribution of the kinds of
mistakes and the magnitude of the costs of those mistakes are of
substantial moment. These two considerations are critical in evaluating
the use of science in identifying and regulating carcinogens.4
Third, for institutions that must function within a democratic
society, to what extent should they articulate with the democratic
procedures and reflect the democratic will?5
Fourth, and related to the above point, institutions should be
evaluated in terms of whom they politically empower. Kantrowitz seeks
to limit the influence and power of scientists in institutions that must
make mixed science-policy decisions and believes that science courts
will achieve this goal. (Whether he is right on this is a further question
to which we return.)
Fifth, in many cases the rate of decisions is also quite important; in
others less so. In research science, the rate of scientific research is
typically not a desiderata (except to the scientist concerned), unless the
research has substantial social consequences. The rate of development
of an atomic weapon was considered quite important during World War
to light.
4 One should also take into account the costs of the procedures themselves in
evaluating institutional mechanisms for making science-policy decisions, but I
ignore these here. For example, it may be that the criminal law should provide even
greater protections against wrongly convicting innocent people than it does at
present, but if the costs of such protections become too great in monetary terms or
infringe too much on other social values (e.g., permitting too many crimes to go
unpunished), then the social costs of more extensive protections may be too great.
The monetary and social costs of present procedures for identifying and regulating
carcinogens are especially high. For a discussion, see Lester B. Lave et al.,
Information Value of the Rodent Bioassay, 336 NATURE 631 (1988), L.B. Lave &
J.S. Omenn, Cost Effectiveness or Short-Term Tests for Carcinogenicity, 324
NAuRE 29-34 (1986).
5 Kantrowitz claims that present institutions have insufficient democratic input
and that there is insufficient democratic control over such decisions, because
scientists tend to dominate even the non-scientific aspects of decisions.
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II and the rate of research on AIDS is presently of great concern.
However, when institutional decisions based on scientific research have
social consequences, such as those with which we are concerned, the
rate of decision making may be very important.
Finally, it is important that the overall decision in mixed science-
policy disputes be within the limits of acceptability to those affected by
it. Presumably a science court would further this goal because at least
the factual basis would be agreed to by the science court "judges" even
if other aspects of the decision were subject to dispute. While science
courts might preserve or enhance the standing of the scientific
community, it is not clear that they will enhance the validity of overall
mixed science-policy decisions.
Scientific Accuracy and Evidentiary Procedures
My first concerns with science courts cluster around the idea of
scientific accuracy and attendant evidentiary procedures. Advocates of
science courts claim that scientific facts can be separated from normative
considerations. While there is much to this claim for many disputes, in
carcinogen risk assessment it is difficult, in many cases impossible, to
separate facts from normative or policy judgments so as to facilitate
social decisions.6 My modest concern rests on the observation that in
order to come to conclusions about the nature and extent of risks from
carcinogens, risk assessors must rely upon numerous policy judgments,
and if they do not, little socially useful information is available. Some of
these are "science" policy judgments - scientific generalizations that are
relied upon in particular cases which may or may not be accurate for the
substance in question - and some are normative judgments, e.g., one
should not take chances with human health.7 Moreover, risk
assessors must also choose between several plausible policies in order
6 My view is not the one attributed to some sociological relativists that "scientific
risk assessment - indeed science generally - is inevitably a product of, if not
entirely constructed from - socio-cultural values." Deborah G. Mayo, Toward a
More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk, II PHIL. Sci.
ASSN. 1988,491 (A. Fine & J. Leplin eds.)
7 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CAR-
CINOGENs, 25 (1987).
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to have socially useful information, and these choices have substantial
normative consequences.
To establish that a substance, X, is a human carcinogen, several
policy decisions must be made. For epidemiological studies a number of
judgments, not straightforwardly scientific, are appropriate: What are
the relative weights of positive and negative studies? What are the
relative weights of prospective and case-control studies? What statistical
significance is required for studies to be considered positive? What is
the scientific or public health significance of positive findings when the
route of exposure is different from a population at risk?8 And, finally,
might these decisions be made differently for pure scientific research
versus research for public health purposes?
Even the seemingly uncontroversial notion of statistical significance
is infected with policy considerations. There is a scientific convention
that a study must have a significance of .05 or lower to be scientifically
valid, but this may not be decisive for either scientific or public health
issues. One can show for an epidemiological study that on the same
facts - same sample sizes, same background disease rates, and same
reported disease or death rate - the choice of what constitutes a
statistically significant result will affect whether the study is considered
positive or negative.9 The raw data are not decisive; interpretation and
the purposes for which the study will be used are equally critical.
Similar statistical and policy problems plague the interpretation of animal
studies. The point is not just that scientists in particular areas of research
need convention to guide their interpretation of results or to determine
what scientific evidence is valid or credible. This is expected simply
because they are engaged in a human activity. 10 Yet, the appropriate
conventions may, and probably should, vary depending upon the
purposes for which data will be used. I return to this in comparing
burdens of proof in science and the law.
8 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AssEssmENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
29-30 (1983).
9 CARL F. CRANOR. REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ANIYTHE LAW (1993). Standard statistics textbooks also discuss the same point.
10 Allan Mazur suggested this point.
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The first point is related to a second, equally basic issue. Even
something as fundamental to scientific judgments as hypothesis
acceptance and rejection tests have implicit social policy judgments in
them. These tests were developed: 11
in a certain decision theoretic framework where there would
be a clear basis for the test specifications... tests are
formulated as mechanical rules or recipes for reaching one of
two possible decisions: 'act as if H were true' or 'act as if H
were false', according to whether H is accepted or
rejected.... By considering such consequences the scientist
is, presumably, able to specify the risks he can 'afford'....
However, this opens the door to the... relativist's concern.
For such considerations of consequences - in our case
social, ethical and economic - are clearly policy matters; so
it appears that specifying a test is tantamount to making a
policy decision....
The problem with such tests is "automatically equating rejections of H
(statistically significant differences) with finding substantively important
discrepancies from H, and failures to reject H with finding...
unimportant discrepancies." 12
Moreover, this raises the concern that different statistical cutoff
points may be appropriate for different scientific and social purposes
and concerns about what constitutes appropriate "facts". If the
conventional cutoff is met, scientific data are established as credible or
valid, and if it is not, they are not. However, conventionally specified
test cutoffs can be misleading for there may be perfectly good clues and
evidence of harm even though a particular test of significance is not
met. 13 And, such conventions may beg some social policy issues (I
return to this later).
More neutral ways have been suggested for presenting the results of
statistical studies, ones that do not rely upon conventions of either
statistical significance or hypothesis acceptance and rejection. 14 These
strategies avoid some of the problems of relying upon policy
considerations, but they pose others. For one thing,-the attempt to purge
I1 Mayo, supra note 6, at 496.
12 Id., at 496-7 (emphasis added).
13 Talbot Page, The Significance of P-Values (forthcoming).
14 Mayo, supra note 6, at 497-501.
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carcinogen risk assessment of all policy considerations is likely to make
the resulting document or report nearly unintelligible to all but a small
class of experts - and of little use for the larger policy debates. This
hardly serves social debate or understanding. For instance, in reporting
the results from animal studies, should scientists report merely the
number of tumors in the experimental and the control groups (which
will not be terribly helpful to policy makers and can be controversial in
contested cases) or go beyond this (relatively) raw data15 and judge
whether this increase is significant? If the latter, they then encounter the
problems just indicated. Of course, scientists might agree that there was
a statistically significant increase in animal cancers but disagree whether
that was evidence that a substance caused human cancer. But these
further disagreements will also likely depend upon implicit policy
considerations. 16 Second, according to the science court model,
science court judges would render a decision about which side is right.
But this will pose other problems (discussed later). It seems, then, that
advocates of science courts may be unduly optimistic about possible
agreement in controversial cases.
Further, scientists and policy makers using animal studies as
evidence for the claim that a carcinogen has a certain potency in humans
face more problems. If scientists from opposing sides in a science court
were to try to agree about what they knew, they might only agree on the
experimental evidence, i. e., on the tumor counts in experimental and
control groups of animals (and even that could be controversial). It is
unlikely they would agree on the potency numbers at low doses for
humans. 17 In fact, if one insisted on unanimity for a science court in
sharply contested cases, it would have to report that "there was not
agreed-upon scientific evidence of the potency at low doses."
15 Even for tumor reports there are disagreements about which tumors or unusual
growths should count as evidence for carcinogenicity in animals and humans;
IDEfNFYING AND REGULATING CARcaNOGENs, supra note 7, at 49-50.
16 Cranor, supra note 9, at 13-28.
17 Philip H. Abelson, Testing for Carcinogens With Rodents, 249 SCIENCE 1357
(1990).
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Thus, contrary to assumptions favoring science courts, it is, at a
minimum, difficult to separate scientific fact from policy considerations
in carcinogen risk assessments. Or, if there is success in achieving the
separation, the results may be of little use in public debate. Thus, it is
not clear how many facts might be scientifically uncontroversial to
judges of such a court. And separately, it is unclear in sharply contested
cases how much agreement could emerge between opposing
scientists. 18
Sufficiency of Evidence Generally
Underlying the above concerns is a view that scientific and other
evidentiary procedures are not unerringly accurate. Thus, when doing
research or making mixed science-policy decisions, we must rely upon
the evidence available, but, evidence for a conclusion neither
guarantees its correctness nor automatically reveals its credibility for a
particular conclusion. How we use such evidence and the significance
we attach to it bears on these issues. In research on carcinogens there
are intra-scientific disagreements concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence that a substance is a carcinogen and possible disagreements
between the scientific and policy communities about appropriate
standards of the sufficiency of evidence to support the claim that
something is a human carcinogen.
For example, to have sufficient evidence that a substance is a
carcinogen, some scientists have insisted not only on good
epidemiological studies and good animal studies in several different
species at exposure levels and routes of administration equivalent to that
of humans, but also several positive short-term tests. 19 Requiring such
evidence as necessary and sufficient to treat something as a human
carcinogen will lead to disagreement between scientists and to
18 To see this, consider recent court litigation revealing disagreements between the
government and industry as to the correct assumptions regarding risk assessment:
ASCARCO v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483, 492-95 (9th Cir. 1986), Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1495-98 (D.C. Cir. 1986), Building and
Construction Trades Dept. v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
19 Arthur Furst, Yes, But Is It a Human Carcinogen? 9 J. AM. COLL ToxICOL 1
(1990).
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disagreements between some scientists and the public and regulatory
communities. Thus, adversarial scientists are unlikely to agree on such a
point in sharply contested cases. Further, the use of such stringent
standards of what counts as a human carcinogen would frustrate present
regulatory policies even more than at present,20 because for very few
substances is all the required evidence available.2 1
Moreover, disagreements about the sufficiency of evidence that X is
a carcinogen show how evidentiary standards serve different policy
aims depending upon the context. In many circumstances, there can be
an inconsistency between scientific and legal or social norms of good
evidence - which is in turn a result of the consequences of different
mistakes that are of concern in science and in protecting public health.
Scientists primarily seek to prevent false positives, from falsely adding
to scientific knowledge and mistakenly chasing research chimeras, while
public health advocates are typically concerned to prevent false
negatives, to avoid mistakenly treating a toxin as non-toxic. Even if both
scientists and public health advocates were to agree as a matter of a
decision principle on more general principles for addressing the costs of
mistakes (as they might well)22 , they are likely to disagree about the
relative weight of mistakes to avoid: false positives or false negatives.
Thus, they could and probably will endorse different evidentiary
standards to avoid the mistake they regard as worse.23
To see this point, consider analogous issues in the law. For various
policy reasons, differing evidentiary standards and burdens of proof24
20 IDENTMYING AND REGULA NG CARCINOGENS, supra note 7, at 18-22.
21 Only about 30 substances are listed as known human carcinogens under
California's Proposition 65, and some of these may not satisfy the stringent criteria
discussed in this paragraph. See, e.g., William S. Pease, Identifying Chemical
Hazards for Regulation: The Scientific Basis and Regulatory Scope of California's
Proposition 65 List of Carcinogens and Reproductive Toxicants, 3 RISK 127, 135
(1992).
22 Some economists, for instance, have suggested that the appropriate principle is
one which minimizes the total costs of mistakes. See Lave et. al. and Lave &
Omenn, supra note 4 for discussion of this point.
23 Cranor, supra note 9, at 153-157, and Carl F. Cranor, Scientific Research for
Public Health Purposes, in RESEARCH ETmiCS (Kristin Shrader-Frechette ed. 1993).
24 FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CiVIL PROCEDURE, 249-260 (1977)
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are assigned to one side in legal controversies. Those who fail to carry
their burden to the satisfaction of fact finders such as juries lose, i. e.
they fail to establish certain facts for legal purposes. Consider, for
example, criminal insanity cases. If a defendant in a murder case wishes
to argue that he is not guilty by reason of insanity, then the defendant
must raise that issue. However, this does not dispose of the burden. As
discussed in a legal treatise on evidence, there several possibilities. 25
First, the defendant might have to establish insanity by a preponderance
of the evidence, i.e., insanity is more probable than not. Or he might
have to establish it by "clear and convincing evidence" or the criminal
law's much more difficult "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden.
Conversely, once a defendant raises the question of sanity, the
prosecution might have to show "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
defendant is sane. Thus, whether an otherwise guilty defendant is
adjudged not guilty by virtue of insanity is dependent upon which
evidence is found credible in accordance with established burdens and
levels of proof, i.e., upon who has the burden of proof, how
demanding the burden is and whether the party with the burden has
carried it. Thus, identical evidence can clearly lead to different legal
outcomes in different jurisdictions.
Similarly, implicit burdens of proof in science and in policy areas
that must use scientific evidence determine how much evidence is
sufficient for such areas. I have argued elsewhere that the scientific .05
test of significance is roughly equivalent of the criminal law's "beyond a
reasonable doubt" burden of proof. If this standard is imposed in tort or
regulatory proceedings that normally have less demanding burdens of
proof, this Will frustrate important social goals. Requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt would be inappropriate when the "more likely than
not standard" has been long established as sufficient.26
Moreover, in carcinogen risk assessment and risk management, if
there are disagreements about the sufficiency of evidence that a
(discuss a number of policy reasons for allocating the burden of proof to one party or
another in a legal forum).
25 JoHN H. WGMORE, WIGMOREON EviDE~c § 2501 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1991).
26 Cranor, supra note 9, at 71-78.
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substance is a carcinogen and the more demanding standards of research
science prevail,27 this will tend to skew policy outcomes in favor of the
status quo. In most cases, this will leave substances in commerce until
they are found to pose risks of harm; in a few others, it may keep them
out.2 8 If scientists must have the same degree of confidence in results
that they would if they were doing scientific research, this will result in
several "no decision" or "not enough information for decision"
judgments. 29 Such judgments, while appropriate for scientific
research, in regulating toxic substances for public health purposes may
not be appropriate where scientists may have some information in the
form of clues of harm. Failure to act may leave people at risk from
exposure to a toxic substance.
Furthermore, a report by a science court about what is and is not
known about the substance in question, even if this leaves open the
decision about appropriate action, may be misleading and inadvertently
influence the public debate and decision. Kantrowitz indicates that such
reports would have "presumptive validity."3 0 If "Does X cause cancer
in humans?" is the question framed and answered by the court, the
answer according to some will be negative on the evidence of a few
positive animal studies on scientific grounds alone.3 1 Thus, the court
might answer that there is some evidence of carcinogenic activity in
animals and in short-term tests but, as a matter of the science, it cannot
be concluded that X is a human carcinogen. Such a decision could easily
be arrived at by scientists indicating what they did and did not know
about a substance. Yet, it might be quite misleading and unduly
persuasive in public debates if the public fails to understand the
implications of the claim about human carcinogenicity. That scientists do
27 This also raises the question of which kinds of scientists should make
presentations to a science court.
28 IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINOGENS, supra note 7, at 199-200.
29 Kantrowitz, supra note 2, at 507, even indicates that science courts should have
no hesitation is issuing negative judgments about the science when there is
"inadequate evidence" for a view. I certainly agree, but one must be quite careful
about when evidence is "inadequate" in the regulation of possibly toxic substances.
30 Kantrowitz, supra note 2, at 509.
31 Furst, supra note 19.
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not have the kind, amount and quality of evidence needed for certain
purposes to conclude that X is a human carcinogen should not determine
whether it should nevertheless be treated as such for other purposes.
Moreover, this concern about the contents of a report from a science
court raises further issues about the implicit burdens of proof in science
and its evidentiary conservatism.
Sufficiency of Evidence in Science
Some may believe that burdens of proof are not present in science,
but they are mistaken. There is an appropriate background assumption
in science that departures from the knowledge status quo ante must be
justified by evidence and theories before scientists can add to the stock
of scientific knowledge. If we have a substance, X, about which little is
known, any additions to scientific knowledge must satisfy appropriate
standards of evidence, research practices and peer review procedures
before new information is accepted as scientifically sound. These
evidentiary standards and concomitant procedures implementing them
constitute implicit burdens of proof not dissimilar from those in the law.
However, one important difference is that legal burdens of proof are
designed (more or less deliberately) to serve the aims of the institution
and vary with the area of law, being quite stringent in the criminal law
and less stringent in tort and regulatory law because of different
purposes the different areas of law serve.
Implicit burdens of proof in science have been designed or have
evolved to serve the aims of scientific understanding and research, not
necessarily to serve public policy purposes. It is not surprising, then,
that scientific and public health burdens of proof, for example, may be
different. However, we should not have institutional procedures that
may conflate the two and substitute a less appropriate burden. Proposed
science courts risk doing just that. Thus, a finding that there is not
sufficient evidence that a substance is a human carcinogen may merely
be the claim that the scientific burdens of proof required to show that it
is a human carcinogen have not been met. It does not follow that the
substance ought not to be treated as a human carcinogen or that it ought
not to be the object of precautionary regulatory action. In fact there may
Cranor: Mixed Science-Policy Decisions 127
be sufficient evidence to take precautionary action, even if there is not
sufficient evidence to establish on research scientific grounds that the
substance is a human carcinogen.
If a science court implicitly endorses the evidentiary standards of
research science, it inadvertently reinforces what is typically one (the
anti-regulatory position) side of the larger public debate about
identifying and regulating carcinogens primarily because of the laws
involved. Such an outcome may be inadvertent - resulting from the
design of science courts and the explicit or implicit evidentiary
procedures that scientists bring to it. We should not permit such
accidental results, but design institutional procedures to address the
problems directly. Perhaps a better approach (to which I return at the
end) is to have public debates about the wisdom of one mixed science-
policy course of action versus others, with all sides being as explicit as
possible about both the scientific and the policy aspects of their view
and then resolve those in some appropriate way.32 The science court
proposal appears to predispose such debates in inappropriate ways.
The burdens of proof just described make scientific research an
epistemically conservative institution; information is added cautiously
and only after demanding scrutiny. In the regulation of toxic substances
this can have substantial effects on public policy and the public health.
There will be a tendency to evaluate each substance on a substance-by-
substance basis, for otherwise one is not evaluating carefully each
substance. Such analysis is slow, and several procedures for identifying
carcinogens are insensitive (they may not detect a risk of harm even
when it is present). This, combined with many laws that leave
carcinogens in commerce until an agency has established that they pose
risks of harm, indicates that few substances will be addressed. Both
may leave human carcinogens unidentified and unaddressed as
carcinogens for a considerable period of time. Science courts appear to
reinforce this evidentiary conservation, which raises questions about
their appropriate use.
32 By way of democratic procedures or by means of negotiation as Sheila Jasanoff
suggests, e.g., infra at 150.
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Time Considerations
As mentioned above, science courts were originally conceived to
address "big science" questions such as whether nuclear power is "safe
enough" to use for producing electricity. When I first considered this, it
seemed that despite several reservations expressed above, such
procedures might provide for social decision making provided that the
issues were general enough and sufficiently divorced from normal
regulatory procedures that they would not become an impediment.
It seems clear that science courts should not become part of the
ordinary regulatory procedures for evaluating toxic substances. Present
procedures for identifying toxins, conducting potency and exposure
assessments and coming to a regulatory decision are much too slow.
Their slowness leaves a large universe of substances unassessed, and
thus people at risk. We need faster, not slower and not more science-
intensive procedures. 3 3 Science courts as part of ordinary regulatory
processes at the EPA, OSHA or FDA seem likely to make regulatory
processes even slower than they are at present. Proposed science court
procedures seem roughly analogous to formal adjudicatory procedures
within the agencies, the slowest and most cumbersome legal procedures
that are most likely to frustrate more expeditious agency actions. Such
considerations argue against incorporating science courts into ordinary
agency procedures.
After reflecting upon some of the shortcomings of procedures
aiming to separate scientific fact from policy and issues of "accuracy," I
am not sure science courts would serve well to address even large scale,
more general scientific issues. For one thing, such questions frequently
are not posed except in the more ordinary processes of regulatory
agencies. Questions about nuclear safety usually are raised only when
there are regulatory questions: Should a new reactor be licensed? Should
an old one be decommissioned? However, it is possible that science
courts could have a role in addressing large-scale issues provided that
they do not frustrate the charge of the agency they aim to serve. On
occasions when there might be special inquiries independent of
33 IDN'rIfYING AND REGULATNG CARCINOGENS, supra note 7, at 19-22; Cranor,
supra note 9, at 122-129 and 141-147; Carl F. Cranor, The Social Benefits of
Expedited Risk Assessment (forthcoming).
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regulatory proceedings, science courts might appropriately be used,
provided they have no other serious shortcomings.
If more general, as well as specific, scientific debates are infected
with policy considerations, incorporate possibly misleading standards
for the sufficiency of scientific evidence and such, so as to make it
difficult to separate scientific facts from values, then I have reservations
about using the courts to address even more general issues. But this is
more open, depending upon the area of science and the issues at stake.
Not all technological and scientific issues on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge may be as unsettled, uncertain, and infected with social
policy issues as carcinogen risk assessment. If not, then science courts
may be more appropriately used.
The Need for Public Scrutiny of Science
A claim that there is not agreed-upon scientific evidence for human
carcinogenicity of a substance, or that it did not have harmful potency at
levels of human exposure, can have substantial but misleading
credibility in public debates. Because of the aura attached to scientific
claims, the public and decision makers are likely to understand such
claims as having a kind of unchallenged credibility. However, such
claims may be quite misleading precisely because scientific theories and
data in this area are so unsettled and controversial. Problems can arise
because evidence of human carcinogenity, in light of public health goals
and some scientific generalizations, may justify precautionary action. A
public policy decision must be made about what to do in light of sketchy
evidence, underdetermined theories and substantial public interests. In
some cases, authorizing further studies or doing nothing may be
appropriate; in others, precautionary action may be. Yet, a report of a
science court may unduly chill public discussion.
The last point raises a fundamental psychological or sociological
point underlying the felt need for a science court. Kantrowitz and others
argue for the importance of accuracy, worrying that science may become
tainted if it is not accurate or becomes too contaminated by public policy
disputes. This is a legitimate concern, but there is more than one side to
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the issue. If science maintains its "purity," this insures that, when
scientists speak as scientists, they will have a certain automatic
credibility. Their statements will be adjudged as beyond dispute, at least
by lay persons. While it is easy to see the benefits for the scientific
community, benefits for the general public are less clear. Scientific
evidentiary standards preserve the knowledge status quo until evidence
passes enough tests to overcome the implicit burdens of proof in the
field, but this can frustrate good public health policy.
For the sake of public health protection, it is important that the
public question both policies and their scientific bases. Thus, if the
findings of a science court were to have a kind of automatic credibility
which is epistemically conservative and which may beg policy
questions, this is not necessarily desirable. It may be much better for the
public to be skeptical toward both the scientific and policy judgments,
so that experts in both areas are forced to defend their positions.
Speaking as one who came to debates about carcinogen risk assessment
from a non-biological background, it is clear that we should be skeptical
of scientific claims for two major reasons. First, the "best science"
conventionally conceived is epistemically and (typically) normatively
conservative. Thus, it reinforces the regulatory status quo. Also, what
counts as evidence in debates about carcinogens is so normatively laden
that one's larger philosophic views about health and larger social
policies are critical. Thus, scientific claims should not be free from
public scrutiny and skepticism. It is easy for putative "scientific facts" to
disguise either implicit or explicit world views that should properly be
open to debate. The remedy is not to separate science from policy - if
this can even be done while providing useful information - but to
increase scrutiny of both scientific experts and policy makers.
This raises a final point about the science court proposal. The
suggestion appears to be that the scientific issues related to a particular
policy question can be separated and decided independently of the
particular policy, much as scientists might decide issues in their lab or at
a conference. And the metaphor of a science "court" further suggests
that "judges" might issue a judgment about which side has the correct
scientific view, independent of the policy considerations.
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Enough has been said to indicate what is problematic about both
suggestions. There is an important interaction and substantial subtle
understanding needed between the scientific data, evidentiary standards
for judging it, and the policy decisions to be made. In assessing
contested science-policy issues, one must judge which composite data-
evidence-policy decision would be best in the circumstances, rather than
have a scientific judgment endorsed by a science court independent of
evidentiary standards appropriate to the policy and independent of the
policy goals followed by contested policy debates of the scientific
decision. At least in carcinogen risk assessment and risk management, it
appears better, recognizing the complex data-evidence-policy
relationship, to subject the composite product to careful scrutiny,
including the science, than to try to address the scientific and policy
issues completely separately.
Conclusions
Science courts may not be the best way to address mixed science-
policy questions posed in identifying, assessing and regulating toxic
substances. Scientific and policy issues are difficult if not impossible to
separate so as to facilitate social decisions, and appropriate evidentiary
procedures and burdens of proof are dependent on the policy goals of
the activity in question. Also, science court procedures, if used in
ordinary regulatory processes, would appear to make them even slower
than at present, a decidedly bad consequence. Finally, while science
courts might reduce scientific influence over policy decisions, it is at
least as likely that they would inadvertently enhance the power of
scientists over complex science-policy issues to the detriment of
democratic decision making in the regulation of toxic substances. To
achieve social validity for mixed science-policy decisions concerning
toxic substances, it seems preferable to have critical discussion and
evaluation of composite data-evidence-policy options with the science,
the evidentiary standards, the policies and their subtle interactions
subjected to healthy skepticism.
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Throughout, I have used the assessment and regulation of toxic
substances in examining mixed science-policy disputes. Problems in
this area may or may not be representative of those in other areas. They
appear representative, however, when the following features exist:
Factual issues, plaguedby considerable uncertainty and information
gaps, are at the frontiers of scientific knowledge and infected by policy
considerations; the kinds and costs of mistakes are quite different, in
light of policy goals, from those posed in typical research science
procedures; conservative evidentiary standards of science favor one of
the obvious positions in the political debate; and the rate at which mixed
science-policy decisions are made is important. In such cases, issue
separation as proposed for science courts seems on balance undesirable.
The extent to which this characterizes science-policy disputes elsewhere
is for others to decide.
